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Abstract
While innovation is argued to create value, private incentives of rms to inno-
vate are driven by what part of the value created rms can appropriate. In this
paper we explore the relation between innovation and the markups a rm is able to
extract after innovating. We estimate rm-specic price-cost margins from produc-
tion data and nd that both product and process innovations are positively related
to these markups. Product innovations increase markups on average by 5.1% points
by shifting out demand and increasing prices. Process innovation increases markups
by 3.8% points due to incomplete pass-through of the cost reductions associated
with process innovation. The ability of the rm to appropriate returns from innova-
tion through higher markups is a¤ected by the actual type of product and process
innovation, the rms patenting and promotion behavior, the age of the rm and
the competition it faces. Moreover, we show that sustained product innovation has
a cumulative e¤ect on the rms markup.
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1 Introduction
Today innovation is being hailed as a key driver of growth for the economy and for the
survival and success of individual rms. Understanding the returns to investments in
R&D and other innovative activities is, therefore, a critical step in convincing managers
and policy makers of the importance of making such investments. The debate is not new
and over the past decades, researchers have related research and development spending
with measures of labor and total factor productivity, suggesting a positive relation be-
tween R&D and rm protability and survival (Hall and Mairesse, 2010). Furthermore,
a long tradition exist in estimating the e¤ect of R&D and innovation on the market value
of rms (Czarnitzki et al. 2006).
In this paper we complement and advance the literature by focusing on how rms
prot from their innovation activities through its e¤ect on the markups a rm is able
to extract after innovating. As such, the paper is related to Geroski et al. (1993) who
estimate the relationship between innovation and protability for a sample of large UK
rms, where protability is measured as the accounting net prot margin. However, ac-
counting margins are only noisy measures for true economic margins (Schmalensee, 1989)
- and more importantly the errors in accounting margins are expected to be correlated
with the innovative activities of rms.1 Therefore, we opt for estimating markups instead
of directly observing them from the data. To this end, we rely on the basic insight of
Hall (1988) that market power drives a wedge between the observed share of input costs
in total revenue and the output elasticities of the particular input. The methodology has
been applied in various papers, investigating the impact of trade liberalization on domes-
tic markups (Levinsohn, 2003; Abraham et al. 2009) and the impact of privatization on
markups (Konings, Van Cayseele and Warzynski, 2005) among others. De Loecker and
Warzynski (2012) show how the methodology can generate rm specic markups. Basi-
cally one needs to identify the output elasticities of inputs and by comparing them with
the share of input costs in revenue, one can infer a measure for rm specic markups.
With these rm specic markup estimates at hand, we can estimate the e¤ects of
innovation on these markups. These estimates provide us with some insight on how
rms prot from their innovation activities. Moreover, we distinguish between product
and process innovations. In principle, one would expect process innovations to increase
technical e¢ ciency while the impact on markups depends essentially on the demand
system and the implied cost pass-through. On the other side, product innovation is
thought to increase markups by generating a rm specic demand while its impact on
technical e¢ ciency should be negative, if anything.
In our analysis we nd that both product and process innovation increase rm spe-
1For example, accounting depreciation rates do not reect returns to scale or the economic user cost
of capital. If innovative rms di¤er systematically in their returns to scale or their capital intensity from
non-innovative rms, this could introduce biases in the estimate for the relationship between innovation
and markups.
2
cic markups. More precisely we nd markups to be 3.8% percentage points higher for
rms realizing a process innovation and 5.1% points higher for rms realizing a product
innovation. This is particularly true for smaller rms where the e¤ect of product inno-
vation is more likely felt at the rm level compared to large multi-product rms. This
relationship is robust against controlling for rm and market specic factors inuencing
both innovation and markups.
Our nding on the importance of product innovation in a¤ecting markups and prices
is very consistent with the ndings of Foster et al. (2008) that show that idiosyncratic
demand shocks seem to a¤ect rm performance and survival more than shocks to pure
technical e¢ ciency. While we cannot claim to have isolated all possible e¤ects on markups
and rm productivity through innovation, a substantial part of the demand side variation
found across rms could be explained by these product innovation activities at the rm
level. Hence, we argue that the role of R&D investments related to product innovation and
more importantly, ex post successful product innovation could be an important factor in
explaining observed heterogeneity between rms (Syverson, 2011). Our results on process
innovation contrast with the ndings of the productivity literature that have typically
found no e¤ect or a negative e¤ect on revenue productivity of process innovation.
In separate analyses we conrm that changes in rm prices are directly related to
product innovation and process innovation. While product innovations tend to increase
prices, process innovation is more likely to decrease prices. From our analysis we can also
infer marginal costs and show that only process innovation tends to lower marginal costs.
Product innovation has no signicant e¤ect on costs. These e¤ects are consistent with
product innovation shifting out demand, and process innovation reducing costs, while
both a¤ect the the rm specic markup.
After conrming the positive and economically signicant e¤ect of both product and
process innovation on the rms markups, we attempt to dig a little deeper into how rms
actually prot from these innovations. First, we examine the e¤ect of di¤erent types of
product and process innovation. Our results indicate that especially product innovation
involving new design or new functions of the product and process innovation due to the
introduction of new machinery inuence the markup positively.
Second, following a long literature on the relation between market structure and inno-
vation, we show that product innovation allows innovative rms in intermediately com-
petitive markets to appropriate returns from their innovation e¤orts through increases
in their markups. Atomistic and monopolistic markets are less related to increases in
markups through innovation. Process innovations only impact markups in less competi-
tive markets as cost improvements are not fully passed through to clients.
When the intellectual property rights regime is tight, appropriation of returns to
innovation is often related to the ability of the rm to protect outcomes from their R&D
e¤orts through patenting. We do nd an important increase in markups due to the
existence of patents of the rm. But interestingly, very few rms apply for patents at the
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time they innovate. So the innovation remains a signicant driver of rm level markups.
Moreover, after controling for actual successful innovation in the form of product or
process innovations, R&D does not a¤ect rm level markups.
When the intellectual property rights regime is weak, Teece (1986) argues that rms
can attempt to prot from innovation through access and ownership of complementary
assets. An important complementary asset is related to the ability of rms to market their
products. We nd that promotion activities do a¤ect our rm level markups signicantly
in addition to product innovation.
Finally, we investigate the dynamic consequences of product and process innovation
for the rms markups. Firms can appropriate the returns to innovation over time through
the persistent e¤ect on their markups over time. Indeed, our results indicate that prod-
uct and process innovation increase long run markups by about 3 percent. Furthermore,
sequential product innovations push up the markups for small rms that innovate persis-
tently.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical
strategy for estimating rm specic markups. Section 3 presents the dataset. The main
results on markups and the e¤ect of product and process innovation are presented in Sec-
tion 4. Section 5 discusses how rms appropriate returns from their innovation activities
and Section 6 disentangles the markup e¤ects into variations in prices and marginal costs.
Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Empirical Strategy
This secton introduces the methodology we use to infer markups from production data.
First, we show how markups can be derived from the di¤erence between input cost shares
and output elasticities. Second, we demonstrate our empirical strategy to consistently
estimate the output elasticities.
2.1 Markups
Our methodology builds on the seminal work by Hall (1988) who used for the rst time
production data, i.e. data on inputs usage and the total value of output, to estimate
markups. The work by Hall generated an entire literature on estimating markups using
production data either at the industry level or more recently at the rm level (f.e. Do-
mowitz et al. 1988 and Roeger 1995 among others). Typically, a sector level markup
was estimated and subsequently related with the variable of interest, measured at the
sector level as well. For example in the international trade literature, the methodology
was used to test the imports-as-market disciplining device (Levinsohn, 1993). Konings
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et al. (2001, 2005) relate markups with competition policy and privatization during the
transition process in Central and Eastern European countries respectively. The method-
ology is equally suited to estimate rm specic markups needed for our purposes. De
Loecker and Warzynski (2012) use production data to retrieve markups at the rm level
and related these with rm level export status. The remainder of this section briey
describes the methodology to infer rm level markups using production data. For a more
detailed exposition, we refer the interested readers to De Loecker and Warzynski (2012).
The basic insight of Hall (1988) is that only under perfect competition input revenue
shares equal input cost shares.2 The gap between the two measures could in principle be
used to identify the markups charged by the rm. Basically this identication strategy
poses two problems. First, total costs of the rm are hard to determine as for example the
user cost of capital is unknown. Second, the returns to scale are not readily observable
such that it is hard to infer marginal costs from average costs. The solution is to add a
fairly mild behavioral assumption, namely that of cost minimization. It is easy to show
that any cost minimizing entity will choose its input level such that the output elasticity
of the particular input equals its input cost share, namely
PXit Xit
citQit
=
@Qit
@Xit
Xit
Qit
(1)
where Xit is the input choice of input X by rm i in period t, PXit is the price of that
input, cit represents marginal costs and Qit total output of the rm. The right hand side
is the output elasticity of input X. When we dene the markup it as the ratio of price
over marginal costs; it  Pitcit , it immediately follows that
it
PXit Xit
PitQit
= "Xit
with "Xit the output elasticity. Under perfect competition, prices equal marginal costs and
consequently the cost minimizing input choice will be such that the revenue share equals
the output elasticity of the input. Under imperfect competition, the revenue shares are
typically lower compared to the output elasticities. Dene Xit  P
X
it Xit
PitQit
such that the
markup can be written as
it = "
X
it =
X
it (2)
and one can immediately see that with an estimate for the output elasticity, one can
easily compute a rm level markup as Xit is directly observable in a typical dataset.
3 ;4
2The revenue share of an input is the total cost of that input divided by total revenue. The input
cost share is dened as total cost of the input over marginal cost times total output. Under constant
returns to scale, marginal cost equals average costs and the denominator is then equal to the total cost.
3In principle, one could derive exactly the same expression for capital input and infer markups from
a comparison between the share of the user cost of capital in total value added and the output elasticity
of capital input. However, one can expect the capital stock to have substantial adjustment costs, which
drives a wedge between the cost shares and output elasticities. Separating adjustment costs from markup
di¤erences would require specc assumptions about the functional form of adjustment costs.
4The methodology is based on the same intuition which is often used to infer total factor productivity
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The advantage of the described methodology are the fairly modest assumptions that
one has to make. The only assumptions imposed are cost minimization and the presence
of at least one freely adjustable input and one can remain agnostic about the mode of
competition or the functional form of demand. The framework encompasses a wide variety
of static models of price and quantity competition (De Loecker and Warzynski, 2012).
We will estimate a value added production function to determine output elasticities. As
capital is highly likely to have substantial adjustment costs, we will use labor as input to
measure rm specic markups.5 ;6
2.2 Identifying output elasticities
As input revenue shares are readily observable in standard datasets, the main di¢ culty
is to consistently estimate (rm level) output elasticities. We depart from the standard
Cobb-Douglas production function and estimate a translog production function (Chris-
tensen et al. 1973). This is important as the Cobb-Douglas functional form restricts the
output elasticities to be constant across rms within one industry and all rm level het-
erogeneity in the revenue shares is assumed to be due to rm-level variations in markups.
The translog production function is more exible and renders rm level variation in out-
put elasticities. Assuming Hicks neutral technological progress, the translog production
function can be written as:
qit = llit + kkit + lll
2
it + kkk
2
it + lklitkit + !it + it (3)
where lower case variables denote natural logarithms, so lit is log labor in rm i in period
t and qit denotes log value added.7 Productivity shocks anticipated by the rm are
represented by !it, while it consists of measurement error and shocks in output the rm
does not take into account when making its input decisions. A Cobb-Douglas production
function is nested in the above representation and can be obtained by restricting the
higher order term parameters ll; lk and kk to be equal to zero. With the coe¢ cients
by applying the so-called index number approach. Under the assumption of perfect competition, one
does not need to estimate output elasticities but can easily compute them as the input revenue shares.
Under imperfect competition the revenue shares need to be adjusted with a factor equal to the markup.
5Note that also labor could have adjustment costs which would bias our estimates for the markup
levels. However, the empirical strategy to determine the relationship between markups and innovation
will not be a¤ected as long as the size of adjustment costs is not systematically related to our variables
of interest.
6Imperfect competition in the labor market could also create a wedge between input revenue shares
and output elasticities. For example, the presence of unions tend to bias the markup estimates, but only
under an e¢ cient bargaining regime. When bargaining between unions and rms is best described by
right-to-manage, a cost minimizing rm will again choose its optimal labor input such that the output
elasticity equals the labor cost share. (Crépon et al. 2007, Abraham et al. 2009)
7We estimate a value added production function given the problems to separately identify the labor
and materials coe¢ cient in a revenue production function (Bond and Soderbrom, 2005). Moreover, using
a translog production function we would not only have to estimate a coe¢ cient on material input but
on the interactions between materials, labor and capital as well.
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on labor and capital at hand, the output elasticity of labor can be computed as:
"Lit = l + 2lllit + lkkit
Clearly, although production function coe¢ cients are the same for all producers, output
elasticities di¤er across rms depending on their input use.
In order to consistently estimate the input coe¢ cients, one has to solve for the possible
endogeneity of capital and labor as the input choices of a prot maximizing rm are likely
to be correlated with the unobserved productivity shock !it. To control for this we rely on
the insights of Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). The basic idea
is that optimal input choices either investment (Olley and Pakes, 1996) or materials
(Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003) hold information about the level of productivity. We opt
to use the material demand function mit = mt(!it; kit; zit) which can be inverted to proxy
for productivity if optimal material demand is monotonically increasing in !it. The zit
vector represents additional variables a¤ecting material demand across rms and within
rms over time. Given our setting, these include product and process innovation. For
example if an innovation coincides with the use of new intermediate inputs, this is likely
to change optimal input demand. Inverting the material demand function allows us to
write !it as a function of observables, i.e. !it = ht(mit; kit; prodit; procit) where prodit
and procit represent a dummy equal to one if the rm has realized a product or process
innovation respectively. When we plug this in in (3), we obtain an equation
qit = llit + kkit + lll
2
it + kkk
2
it + lklitkit + ht(mit; kit; prodit; procit) + it (4)
that allows us to estimate the labor coe¢ cients l, ll and lk. In the estimation, we
approximate the ht() function by including a fourth order polynomial in materials and
capital where each term is interacted with the product as well as process innovation
dummies.8 Clearly, the capital coe¢ cients are not separately identied from the ht()
function, but we can retrieve an estimate bit for the composite function containing the
capital terms and productivity, it  kkit+kkk2it+ht(mit; kit; prodit; procit).9 This rst
stage provides us in principle with su¢ cient information to compute the labor output
elasticities and thus rm specic markups. However, we will use the capital coe¢ cients
as well to check at each observation whether the production function is quasi-concave 
which is not ascertained for a translog production function. Moreover we want to infer
returns to scale and relate them with our markups estimates.
In the second stage we can identify the capital coe¢ cients by relying on timing as-
sumptions on the capital stock and the law of motion of productivity. We follow the
standard assumption that productivity follows a rst order Markov process but consis-
tent with the economic environment, rms can inuence their productivity level in period
8We include time dummies as well and estimate the production function for each sector separately.
9Although the presence of log labor provides su¢ cient variation to identify the coe¢ cient lk on the
interaction term litkit, we also experimented with a specication where we identify lk in the second
stage and the main results did not change.
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t through investments in R&D in period t   1, similar to Aw, Roberts and Xu (2011).
The productivity evolution can be written as !it = g(!it 1; RDit 1) + it, where RDit 1
is total R&D spending in period t 1 and it represents a shock to productivity in period
t, unexpected at period t 1. For each candidate vector of capital coe¢ ciens (k; kk), we
can compute productivity b!it = bit   kkit   kkk2it which we non-parametrically regress
on lagged productivity and lagged R&D. We include as well the innovation indicators
in this equation to control for unobserved demand factors (cf. infra). The result is an
estimate for the unexpected shock in productivity, it. To identify the capital coe¤cients,
we take the standard assumption that it takes one period to order, receive and install new
capital. As a result, contemporaneous capital and capital squared are uncorrelated with
the productivity shock it, unforeseen at period t  1. The resulting moment conditions
are
E

itj kitk2it

= 0 (5)
which are used to estimate the capital coe¢ cients applying GMM. To sum up, our empiri-
cal strategy goes as follows: after obtaining an estimate bit by executing a semi-parametric
regression of output on inputs in the rst stage, we take a candidate vector of input co-
e¢ cients to compute b!it = bit   kkit   kkk2it. By non-parametrically regressing b!it
on its lagged value controlling for time e¤ects and including innovation dummies we
retrieve an estimate for the unexpected productivity shock it which is used to construct
the sample analogue of the above moment conditions. By bringing this sample analogue
as close as possible to zero, one nds consistent estimates for the capital coe¢ cients of
the production function.
We add two remarks about the estimation procedure. First, our measure for rm level
output is in fact value added deated with a sector level price deator. Consequently, the
error term of the production function (3) includes unobserved rm specic deviatons from
the average industry price which are potentially correlated with the inputs of the produc-
tion function. This could introduce a bias in our estimates for the output elasticities and
consequently in our markup estimates. However, as long as the bias is not systematically
related to the innovative activities of a rm, our results are not a¤ected.10 Moreover, as
De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) show, the bias in the markup estimate when using a
translog production function are a function of the log input quantities which we include
in our markup regressions as control.11 A second consequence of the use of deated value
10Mairesse and Jaumandreu (2005) have access to output price information for a sample of Spanish
and French rms and nd that the estimated output elasticities hardly change when moving from a
sector level price deator to a rm level price deator.
11Assuming a functional form for the demand system such as a CES demand would allow us
to lter out these demand side elements (De Loecker, 2011) and to estimate for example the impact of
product innovation on demand and physical productivity directly. However, we want to make as few
assumptions as possible about the demand system. Moreover, the assumption of any demand system with
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added as the output measure is that our productivity estimate b!it = bit   kkit   kkk2it
contains demand side elements as well, such as demand shocks induced by innovation.
Hence we include the innovation dummies in the non-parametric regression of productiv-
ity on lag productivity and R&D in the second stage of our estimation procedure.
Second, Ackerberg et al. (2006) point to identication problems of the labor coe¢ cient
in the rst stage of the estimation procedure. Basically, their critique is that conditional
on a non-parametric function in materials and capital there is no useful variation left in the
labor stock to identify the coe¢ cients. As a robustness check we experimented with the
methodology proposed by Wooldridge (2009) to estimate the production function in one
step, which is robust to this critique. More precisely, under the above assumptions !it can
be written as a function of lagged capital, materials, innovation dummies and R&D, i.e.
qit = llit+lll
2
it+lklitkit+kkit+kkk
2
it+ft(mit 1; kit 1; prodit 1; procit 1; R&Dit 1)+
it+ it. Approximating the ft(:) function by a fourth order polynomial, we can estimate
this equation applying linear GMM techniques. Given our timing assumptions, we can use
the lagged labor terms as well as contemporaneous capital as instruments and elements
of the polynomial can act as their own instruments. The drawback of this procedure
is the high amount of polynomial terms included in the equation (around 140 if we
take a fourth order polynomial). In order to reduce the dimensionality of the problem,
we do not interact the polynomial terms with the innovation variables. Applying the
Wooldridge (2009) estimator leaves our main results una¤ected, although the number of
observations that do not satisfy the conditions for well-behavedness of the production
function increases.
3 Data Description
We make use of the ESEE (Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales) dataset which is a
rm level survey that has been running from 1990 till 2008, resulting in an unusually long
panel dataset of almost 20 years. The project was started by the Fundación Empresa
Pública with nancial support of the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology and
is now continued within the Fundación SEPI with continued government support. The
sample includes the population of Spanish rms with 200 or more employees as well as a
stratied sample of small rms comprising 4% of the population of small rms with more
than 10 and less than 200 employees. Small rms that exited the original sample are
replaced by rms with similar characteristics drawn from the current population. The
outcome is a panel dataset of over 4,600 rms active in the manufacturing industries, of
constant markups across rms/over time would be at odds with our ndings. Note that the methodology
proposed by De Loecker (2011) would imply the inclusion of industry output which would be absorbed
in our framework by the time dummies in our industry level production function as well as other factors
that inuence rm specic prices, such as innovation.
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which around 3,400 are small and 1,200 are large.12 Previous research has used the same
data set as it is representative for the Spanish manufacturing industry over this long
period (Delgado et al (2002); Campa (2004); Huergo and Jaumandreu (2004); Salomon
and Shaver (2005); Cassiman and Martines-Ros (2008) among others). We observe the
usual variables needed for the estimation of production functions. We take value added,
double deated by sector wide input and output price indices, as measure for output.
Labor is dened as the number of employees and the real net capital stock is obtained
using the perpetual inventory method.13 Next to these standard variables the dataset
contains information about the innovative activities of the rms. More precisely, we
observe whether a rm has introduced a process or product innovation in a given year
and the total amount of R&D spending, internal as well as external. Moreover it is
observed whether the product innovation was due to the introduction of a new function,
new materials, new components or new design of the product. For process innovation, we
observe whether the innovation was due to the introduction of new production techniques,
to the introduction of new machinery or both. Firms have to report in the survey as
well whether they are exporting part of their production and the total value of exports.
Moreover, they report the total value of imports they make.
Next to the data about innovation and internationalization, rms are asked to report
some market indicators that have possibly an impact on markups and productivity. One
obvious indicator of the erceness of competition in the market is the number of competi-
tors. The ESEE survey asks the respondents to indicate the number of competitors in
their ve most important markets. The answers are classied into four categories, namely
(1) Less than 10 competitors, (2) Between 11 and 25 competitors, (3) Over 25 competi-
tors and (4) Atomistic Market. The fourth category groups rms without competitors
with a signicant market share and who hold themselves a market share of less than 10%
Table 1 displays some summary statistics for the rms included in the dataset. The
sample contains 3,366 rms with less than 200 employees and 1,277 rms employing
over 200 workers.14 The average rm realizes a value added of 21 million euros with 256
employees and a value of the capital stock of 12 million euros. Average labor productivity
equals 57,300 euro and large rms are substantially more productive compared to small
rms. Moreover the share of labor costs in value added is slightly higher for small rms
compared to large rms. Around one fourth of the rms realizes a product innovation in
a given year while around one third realizes a process innovation. Not surprisingly, the
percentage of both product and process innovators is higher for large rms. Note that this
12Firms are dened as large when they employ over 200 workers in the period they enter the dataset.
Even if employment drops below 200, they remain "large". Likewise, a small rm is dened as small if
it employs less than 200 employees in the entering year.
13We experimented as well with number of hours worked as a measure for labor input and the book
value of tangible xed assets as a measure for the capital stock and results did not change.
14The number of small and large rms do not sum up to the total number of rms as the rm gets
re-evaluated to be either small or large after a merger or split of the company.
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does not imply that large rms can be considered to be more innovative. As large rms
are involved in more activities, they are more likely to produce an innovation in one of
them (Hall, 2011). Finally, around 60% of the rms export at least one product and 61%
import from abroad. Concerning the number of competitors in the market, the majority
of the rms is active in a market with less than 10 competitors while almost a quarter of
the small rms is active in an atomistic market (no competitor with a signicant market
share and own market share less than 10%).
4 Results
This section discusses the results of the identication of rm level markups and their rela-
tion with the innovative activities of the rms. Firstly, we show results for the production
function parameter estimates. Secondly, we use these estimates to compute markups and
thirdly we relate them with the variables of interest.
4.1 Production Function
In a rst step, we estimate rm level output elasticities. More precisely we estimate
equation (3). We estimate both translog and Cobb-Douglas production functions.15 Un-
der Cobb-Douglas, the coe¢ cients of the higher order terms in the production function
are equal to zero. In a rst step, we estimate the production function for each sector
separately. The manufacturing sector is divided into 20 separate sectors which coincide
approximately with NACE 2 digit sectors. The production functions are estimated us-
ing a proxy estimator described in the previous section. For comparison purposes we
moreover report output elasticities obtained using Ordinary Least Squares. Results are
displayed in Table 2. Controlling for the endogeneity of labor input lowers the output
elasticity of labor substantially, as expected. This will have important consequences for
the estimate of the level of markups as an upward bias in the labor coe¢ cient estimates
will increase the markup estimates. Not surprisingly, the average output elasticity from
the translog production function is close to the Cobb-Douglas output elasticity.
For the translog production function, the reported output elasticities are averages
across all rms in the industry, hiding substantial heterogeneity. Moreover, there is no
guarantee that the production function is well-behaved for all observed input choices.16
15Moreover, given the importance of allowing for rm level variation in the output elasticities, we
estimated the production function using random coe¢ cients techniques which results in rm specic
output elasticities, not depending on a specic functional form like for the translog production function
(cf. Knott, 2008 and Alcacer et al., 2013 for other applications of the random coe¢ cients model). The
drawback is that we can not control for the endogeneity of inputs. Not surprisingly, the markup is
estimated to be higher, but the conclusions about the relation between markups and innovation are very
similar.
16We say a production function is well-behaved if 1) the function is quasi-concave, so it has convex
isoquants and 2) output increases monotonically with all inputs.
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In Appendix A we derive the conditions for well-behavedness of the translog production
function and we drop all observations violating them.17 Figure 1 displays the distribution
of the output elasticities of labor and capital after the cleaning procedure. Clearly, there
exists substantial variation in these elasticities.
While the translog production function is known to work well on average, less is known
about the rm level output elasticities implied by the production function parameter
estimates. In order to check whether these are sensible, we relate these elasticities with
rm size and costs of long term loans. In accordance with expectations, we nd large
rms and rms with lower costs of long-term loans use more capital intensive technologies.
More detailed results are reported in Appendix B.
4.2 Markups
With our estimates at hand, we can compute average rm level markups using equation
(2) derived in Section 2.1, i.e. it = "
L
it=
L
it. The median markup as well as its standard
deviation for Cobb-Douglas and translog production functions are reported in Table 3.
Not controlling for the endogeneity of labor input renders a median markup of around
1.64 and 1.48 for the Cobb-Douglas and translog production function respectively. Using
our estimates from the translog production function and correcting for endogenous labor
input results in a median markup of 1.20, (average markup 1.32) in line with previous
studies.18 It is interesting to see that moving from the Cobb-Douglas production function
to the translog production function lowers substantially the variation in the markups as
the standard deviation drops from .717 to .579. This points again to the importance
of allowing for rm specic output elasticities. Making a distinction between small and
large rms shows that large rms charge higher markups. The di¤erence in markups is
larger when we restrict the output elasticities to be the same across rms.19
In Figure 2 we report the average markup per sector, computed using the estimates
for a translog production function where we control for the endogeneity of labor input.
Not surprisingly, highest markups can be found in the Chemical Industry. High markups
can also be found in the Publishing sector as well as in the Manufacturing of Food
Products.20 Sectors such as the Textiles, Leather Products, Wood Products and O¢ ce
17As a result we lose around 8% of observations.
18For example Siotis (2003) found an average price-cost margin of around 0:25 (which implies a markup
of 1:33) for Spanish manufacturing rms in the beginning of the 90s. Abraham et al. (2009) report
an average markup of 1.29 in their sample of Belgian manufacturing rms. De Loecker and Warzynski
(2012) report the median markup to be in the range of 1:17  1:28 for Slovenian manufacturing rms.
19This is a direct consequence of restricting the output elasticities to be the same across di¤erent
producers. It is well established that large rms are more capital intensive compared to small rms and
consequently the labor share is likely to be lower. It is important to allow the output elasticities to
reect these di¤erences in production technology, namely to allow large rms to have higher capital
output elasticities and lower labor output elasticities. If not, an upward bias is introduced in the markup
estimate for large rms and a downward bias in the markup estimate for small rms.
20The high ranking of the Food Products Sector and Printing and Publishing sector is less obvi-
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Machinery charge the lowest markups. The rm level correlation with the price-cost
margin computed with average variable costs equals 0:57:21 In Appendix D we explore in
more depth the di¤erence with the accounting markups and show how they systematically
di¤er from one another in line with theoretical predictions. The evolution of the median
markup is plotted in Figure 3 and is found to be strongly pro-cyclical consistent with our
prior and other empirical studies (e.g. Machin and Van Reenen, 1993). The markup fell
considerably during the economic crisis beginning of the nineties. Afterwards, the markup
recovered and has seen a slow but steady decrease between 1996 and 2004. During the
last years before the start of the economic crisis, the markup had been rising again.
All in all, the evolution over time as well as the sectoral distribution of markups look
sensible, increasing condence in the methodology to infer markups. In Appendix C we
show more evidence on the relation between markups and rm/sector level drivers of rm
performance such as market structure, promotional activities, buyer power and market
growth. Correlations between our markup measure and these rm and sector drivers
correspond to our expectations.
4.3 Markups and Innovation
In this section, we relate the markups with rm decisions such as innovation, exports
and imports as well as with market characteristics. The dependent variable is each time
the natural logarithm of the markup such that the coe¢ cients can be interpreted as
percentage di¤erences. In general, the estimated specication is the following:
lnit = 0 + 1prodinnit + 2procinnit +Xit + t + i + "it (6)
where prodinnit and procinnit are dummies equal to 1 if rm i has realized a product
or process innovation in year t. In the framework we include year and sector dummies
which pick up year and sector specic variations respectively in markups. Moreover we
include in several specications rm xed e¤ects, controlling for all unobservable rm
specic factors that inuence the markup and are constant over time. Xit is a vector
of control variables. The vector contains other rm decisions that can possibly have an
impact on markups such as a dummy variable indicating whether the rm exports (De
Loecker and Warzynski, 2012). Similarly, we dene a dummy variable indicating whether
the rm imports.
Furthermore, we include variables that should pick up competition in the market.
Market structure and the competition intensity has been argued to inuence innovation
activities, both theoretically (e.g. Schumpeter 1942; Vives 2008) and empirically (f.e.
ous. However, Siotis (2003) obtains the same result, namely relatively high markups in these sectors.
Moreover, these sectors are typically less subject to foreign competition.
21The median markup computed with accounting data equals 1.30, higher compared to the markup
estimate applying the methodology described above.
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Aghion et al. 2005). Instead of relying on concentration measures such as the Herndahl
Index, we use a self-reported indicator of the number of competitors in the market. This
way we avoid the problems of dening the relevant market to compute the concentration
indices. To control for conditions of appropriability and rm size we have included control
variables such as the capital intensity and rm size dummies in our regressions.22
Results without rm xed e¤ects are reported in Table 4. The specication in column
(1) includes a dummy indicating whether the rm has introduced either a process or prod-
uct innovation. The estimates indicate that a rm realizing an innovation has on average
a 4.8% higher markup than non-innovative rms. Making a distinction between product
and process innovation in column (2) shows that both innovations are signicantly related
to higher markups. More precisely, markups of process innovators are 2.8% higher and
the markup premium of a product innovator is around 3.9%, implying that evaluated at
the mean, the impact on the markup level is respectively around 3.8 percentage points
and 5.1 percentage points for process and product innovation.23 ;24 The rest of the table
reports robustness checks altering the estimation sample and the functional form of the
production function. Column (3) reports results when the output elasticities are obtained
using a Cobb-Douglas production function and column (4) reports results when the pro-
duction function is estimated by OLS. Results are very similar to the base specication.
In Column (5) we restrict attention to rms reporting 100% of their sales coming from the
same product.25 As expected, the estimated markup premium for innovators increases 
although not substantially and especially so for product innovators. In columns (6) and
(7) we split the sample between small and large rms.26 For small rms, the estimated
relationship between product innovation and markups is even stronger while for the large
rms the coe¢ cient on process and product innovation drops substantially, especially so
for product innovation. For large rms product and/or process innovation is likely to
refer only to a small part of production as large rms typically tend to produce many
di¤erent products (Bernard et al. 2009). If the realized innovation is only relevant for
22The size of a rm is categorized into 6 categories based on the number of employees (L): L <
20; 20 < L < 50; 50 < L < 100; 100 < L < 200; 200 < L < 1000 and 1000 < L
23Finding that product innovation increases the markup, should not come as a surprise as product
innovation is believed to shift out residual demand thereby increasing price as well as the markup if
marginal costs do not change. Similarly, process innovation is expected to work on the cost side of
the rm. For the most commonly used demand systems, price changes less than proportionally with
marginal costs, leading to an increase in the markup when marginal costs decrease. Weyl and Fabinger
(2008) make a distinction between cost absorbing and cost amplifying demand systems for which the
markup (dened in absolute terms) respectively decreases or increases in marginal costs. Often demand
is assumed to be log-concave, implying the demand system to be cost absorbing.
24When we exclude the dummies capturing whether the rm is an exporter and/or an importer, the
coe¢ cient on product innovation increases to :052 while the coe¢ cient on process innovation remains
similar in magnitude (results not reported).
25However, the denition of a product is very coarse, namely at a level comparable to the NACE 2
digit level. Not surprisingly, the vast majority of sales comes from the main product dened this way.
For example the median of the percentage of sales realized by the main product is equal to 93%.
26Again, small rms are dened as rms with less than 200 employees.
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part of total production, the impact on the markup at the rm level could be too small
to be picked up by our procedure.27 ;28
The coe¢ cients on the other rm level variables included in the regressions have the
expected signs. Concerning the market structure, in line with expectations, there exists
a signicantly negative relation between the rm level markups and the number of com-
petitors in the most important market. Firms active in an atomistic market set markups
around 4% lower compared to markets with less then 10 competitors in the market. For
the subsample of large rms, the coe¢ cient is somewhat lower in absolute value and not
signicant. However, note that there exists only a small number of observations of large
rms active in atomistic markets. Moreover, it is not clear how this market structure can
be reconciled with rms having over 200 employees.
Exporting and importing at the rm level are associated with considerable markup
premia, namely 4.9% and 10.4% respectively. The result of the export premium is in
line with De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) who report a markup premium for exporters
of around 7.8%. The strong relation between importing activities and markups is also
interesting in its own right and could be explained by the use of high quality inputs in the
production process. Again the relation between exporting and markups drops for large
rms which is not surprising given that the vast majority of large rms export/import.
The e¤ect of innovation on markups might not be contemporaneous. For this reason
we experimented with di¤erent lag structures. Table 5 columns (1) and (2) lags innovation
by one year. In columns (3) and (4) the innovation dummy takes the value of 1 if the
rm innovated at least one time in the past 3 years. In columns (5) and (6) we take
the cumulative innovations over the past 3 years. As one can observe, results are very
consistent across specications, probably due to the persistence of innovation activities
within companies.
To control for unobservables inuencing both innovation and markups we include
rm xed e¤ects in our framework. Now the variation within a rm over time is used
to identify the relevant coe¢ cients. Results are reported in Table 6. The coe¢ cients
for both product and process innovation remain positive and signicant, although the
size of the coe¢ cients drops. This can be caused by measurement error in the innova-
tion variables which display a substantial amount of persistence.29 Results indicate that
27This is consistent with Cohen and Klepper (1996) who take the assumption that process innovation
benets the price cost margin of all output while product innovation only increases price-cost margins
of part of total production. This mechanism gives rise to large rms spending more resources on process
R&D as total returns to process R&D rise proportionally with output while returns to product R&D
increase less than proportionally.
28We observe as well how many product innovations a rm has realized in one year. We nd that
the markup is increasing in the number of product innovation but at a decreasing rate. The results are
available on request.
29Griliches and Hausmann (1986) show that if the variable of interest is highly persistent, the signal
to noise ratio, i.e. the variance in the observed variable due to true variance in the variable versus
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product and process innovation increase markups by close to 1 percent.30 However, the
simple innovation dummy can mask important heterogeneity in the type of innovation.
Di¤erent types of product and process innovations might allow rms to appropriate the
returns to their innovations through markup increases to a di¤erent extent. We observe
whether the process innovation consisted of (a) the introduction of new machinery, (b) the
introduction of new methods for organizing production or (c) the introduction of both
new methods and new machinery. Note that the three categories are mutually exclu-
sive. Around 42% of all process innovations involved the introduction of new machinery
only, 12% involved the introduction of new methods only and 44% consisted of both the
introduction of new machinery and methods.
For product innovation, we can distinguish between product innovations due to (a) the
introduction of new materials, (b) the introduction of new components or intermediates,
(c) new design and appearance (d) the incorporation of new functions in the product.
In contrast to the disaggregation of process innovations, these di¤erent types of product
innovation are not mutually exclusive. The vast majority of product innovations include
the change of design or appearance (namely around 78% of all product innovations). The
other types - new materials, new components and new functions - are prevalent in 49.3%,
48.8% and 45.8% of product innovations respectively.
Results are reported in Column (2) of Table 6. Only product innovations that go
hand in hand with a new design or function of the product are positively and statistically
signicant associated with higher markups. As the di¤erent types of product innovation
are not mutually exclusive, this does not necessarily mean that the introduction of new
materials in the product has no impact on markups. If this introduction goes hand in
hand with a new design of the product, as is often the case, markups will be higher. Con-
structing mutually exclusive categories using the four di¤erent classications would result
in a high number of categories with a relatively small number of observations within each
category. In order to reduce the dimensionality of the categories, we merge the category of
new materials and new components (a and b) and subsequently we disaggregate product
innovation into 7 di¤erent mutually exclusive categories.31 Focusing on the xed e¤ects
results in Table 7 shows that especially the combination between New Design and New
Functions is associated with higher markups whether or not new materials are included.
All in all, it appears that only product innovations that also include changes in the design
the variance due to measurement error, drops when applying a within estimator. Consequently this
exacerbates measurement error bias.
30All regressions include the usual controls as well as the number of competitors and the import and
export dummies. Interestingly, when including xed e¤ects, the estimated export premium in markups
goes away. This result is consistent with the empirical literature that has found the exporter productivity
premium to be due to selection e¤ects instead of learning-by-exporting, where productivity is typically
measured as revenue productivity, i.e. the measure includes rm specic prices and markups
31These are (percentage of product innovations between brackets): (1) Only new materials or com-
ponents [9:9%], (2) Only new functions [6:9%], (3) Only new design [20:5%], (4) Both new materials
and new functions [4:8%], (5) Both new materials and design [23:5%], (6) Both new function and design
[6:8%] and (7) New materials as well as new function as well as new design [27:2%].
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or appearance of the product increase markups.
Turning to the disaggregation of process innovation, shows that only the introduction
of new machinery is positively related with rm specic markups. Surprisingly, when the
new machinery is combined with new methods to organize production, markups appear
not to be a¤ected.
To further control for possible time-varying e¤ects inuencing both innovation and
markups we include the markup lagged one period in the regression framework and instru-
ment for the possibly endogeneous variables. More precisely, we estimate the following
equation:
lnit = 0 + 1 lnit 1 + 2prodinnit + 3procinnit +Xit + t + i + "it (7)
As is well known, OLS will lead to inconsistent estimates of the lagged markup coe¢ cient
given the correlation between the lagged markup and the rm xed e¤ect i. To eliminate
these rm xed e¤ects, we rstly apply the within groups estimator which creates a
downward bias in the estimated coe¢ cient on the lagged markup (Arellano and Bond,
1991). To control for the bias in the estimate for the lagged markup, we estimate equation
7 applying the insight of Blundell and Bond (1998) that rst di¤erences of the lagged
markup are uncorrelated with the error term (i+"it) and that the levels of the two period
lagged markup are uncorrelated with the rst di¤erenced error term "it. Moreover
changes in rm decisions are not correlated with the rm xed e¤ects and can be used
as instruments to estimate the above equation. More precisely, we use the moment
conditions E(it 1(i+ "it)) and E(innovit(i+ "it)). The identifying assumption for
the innovation variables is that they are not related to the contemporaneous markup shock
"it. In a second estimation, we include furthermore the moment conditions E(it 2"it) =
0 as well as further lags of the innovation changes and markup changes and levels as
instruments. Moreover, the moment conditions are constructed in the spirit of Arellano
and Bond (1991), namely we construct a moment condition for each time period.32
Results are reported in Columns 3 to 5 of Table 6. Column (3) reports results from
the within estimator. As long as the downward bias in the coe¢ cient on the lagged
markup does not spill over to the other variables which depends on the correlation
between them the procedure provides consistent estimates of the impact of innovation
on markups. The results are in line with our previous ndings, namely that product
innovation due to new functionalities or new design and process innovation due to the
introduction of new machinery have a positive impact on markups. Column (4) applies
GMM using the (lagged) changes in markups and innovation as instruments. In line
32This procedure results in a large number of instruments. Windmeijer (2005) shows that standard
errors can be substantially downward biased when the number of instruments is large relative to the
number of cross-sectional units. We apply his proposed correction of the standard errors.
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with theoretical predictions the coe¢ cient on the lagged markup increases compared to
the within estimate but remains below the (upward) biased OLS estimate.33 The point
estimates for the innovation variables do not change substantially but the standard errors
increase as expected, leading most variables to be insignicant at the 10% level. Column
(5) exploits additional moment conditions by using further lags (and lagged di¤erences)
as described above, thereby increasing the e¢ ciency of the estimator. Qualitatively the
results do not change although the impact of product innovation due to new functions or
new design is estimated to be somewhat higher.34 All in all the results presented in this
subsection are largely in line with the previous ndings.
An important assumption we have made so far is that rms realizing a product or
process innovation use the same production technology as non-innovative rms within one
industry. When we relax this assumption and estimate separate production functions for
rms that report an innovation and rms that do not, we obtain similar results, both
quantitative as qualitative.
5 Appropriation of Innovation
5.1 Market Structure and the Impact of Innovation
The relation between market structure and innovation has been the subject of a long
debate starting with Schumpeter. As Cohen (2010) indicates, no rm conclusions have
been reached. While markups have been used in the literature to measure market power,
they were calculated at the industry level. We use rm level markups and do control for
the number of competitors of the rm. We check whether the relation between markups
and innovation varies with the market structure. More precisely, we look at the di¤erential
impact of innovation when the rm is active in an atomistic market, a market with less
than 10 competitors or a market with over 10 competitors (but not atomistic). The results
are reported in Table 8. The excluded market structure in the interaction is each time the
atomistic market structure. As such, the coe¢ cient on innovation must be interpreted as
the e¤ect of innovation on the markup in an atomistic market and the coe¢ cients on the
interactions as the di¤erential impact of innovation in other market structures compared
33An OLS regression of the markup on the lagged markups and the other variables results in an
estimate of 0:69 for the coe¢ cient on the lagged markup.
34In the current framework, the coe¢ cients on innovation only reect their short-run impact. The
long-run e¤ect of sustained innovation is measured by s=(1  1) with 1 the coe¢ cient on the lagged
markup and s the coe¢ cient on the innovation dummy. Focusing on Column (5) the estimates imply
that the long run impact of product innovation due to new functions or new design is to increase markups
by 4:25% and 3:00% respectively. Note again that the categories are not mutually exclusive. For example,
an innovation that entails both the introduction of a new function and new design increases the markup
by 7:25%. Process innovation due to new machinery has a long term e¤ect of 2:54%.
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to an atomistic market.35 ;36 Turning to the coe¢ cient on product innovation, it appears
that product innovation in atomistic markets has no impact whatsoever on the markup.
Only rms active in less competitive markets increase their markups following a product
innovation. Note however, that when rm xed e¤ects are included, there appears to be
no impact of product innovation on the markup in markets with less than 10 competitors
as both 1 and 0+1 are not signicantly di¤erent from zero. We do nd an important
e¤ect of product innovation on markups when rms move from an atomistic market to a
less competitive market structure (xed e¤ects regressions in column (3) and (4)). This
could be evidence of the competition escaping e¤ect of product innovations (Aghion et
al. 2005).
Turning to the results of process innovation, again in an atomistic market, there
appears to be no e¤ect of process innovation on the markup as 0 is estimated to be zero.
Only process innovations realized in markets with less than 10 competitors are associated
with markup premia. Although the coe¢ cient on the interaction between a market with
less than 10 competitors and process innovation, 0, is not always signicantly di¤erent
from zero, the total e¤ect 0+1 is always signicant at the 1% level. These ndings are
consistent with previous literature on cost-pass through, establishing that pass-through
will be (close to) one if the market is (close to) competitive. Only in less competitive
markets, part of cost increases are absorbed by a decrease in the markup, or equivalently,
cost decreases are not completely passed through to consumers and as a result increase
the markup as well.
5.2 R&D, Patents and Markups
When protection of intellectual property rights is tight, rms appropriate returns to
innovation through patents (Teece (1986); Ceccagnoli (2009)). In our sample, only 7% of
rms applied for a patent in a given year. Furthermore, rms investing in R&D incur an
important xed cost of investing in innovation and require a higher markup in return for
this investment. In Table 9 column (1) and (2) we control for whether the rm applied
35More precisely we estimate the following equation:
lnit = 0prodinnovit + 1MS1it 1  prodinnovit + 2MS2it 1  prodinnovit
+0procinnovit + 1MS1it 1  procinnovit + 2MS2it 1  procinnovit
+0 + 1MS1it 1 + 2MS2it 1 + controls+ "it
with MS1 a dummy equal to 1 if there are less than 10 competitors in the market and MS2 a dummy
equal to one if there are over 10 competitors in the market (but the market is not atomistic). The e¤ect
of product innovation in an atomistic market is given by 0 while the e¤ect in a market with less than
10 competitors and more than 10 competitors is given by 0 + 1 and 0 + 2 respectively. The same
holds for process innovation.
36We include lagged market structure in the regressions instead of contemporaneous market structure
to take into account that innovation might alter market structure. However, a simple regression of changes
in the number of competitors on innovation indicators does not conrm this hypothesis. Moreover, this
market structure variable is highly persistent over time.
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for a patent in a given year and we estimate the equation by OLS and FE respectively.
Indeed, the markup for patenting rms is signicantly higher, but the e¤ect of product
and process innovation remains signicant in the OLS specication. When including rm
xed e¤ects the coe¢ cient on the patent dummy becomes insignicant. Patents are clearly
not the only mechanism to appropriate returns from innovation outcomes. Columns (3)
and (4) control for the number of patents applied for in a given year.37 Results are very
similar. We add R&D expenditures in columns (5) to (8). R&D expenditures are not
signicantly related to the markup level. This seems to indicate that our other variables
are good controls for rm heterogeneity in markups related to rms investing in R&D.
Furthermore, when we drop the innovation dummies in column (6), the R&D variable
becomes signicant, but has only a small e¤ect on the markup.38 However, in the xed
e¤ects regression, the coe¢ cient on R&D remains statistically signicant when including
the innovation variables as well. Consistent with the ndings of Geroski et al. (1993)
we interpret these ndings as the fact that the innovation event as an outcome is more
important in explaining variation in markups than the R&D variable as an input into
the innovation process. Moreover, rms can innovate without investing in R&D. More
precisely, 41% of rms report zero R&D spending when realizing either a product or
process innovation.
5.3 Complementary Assets and Markups
When the appropriation regime is weak, access or ownership of complementary assets
becomes more prominent in the appropriation of returns to innovation (Teece, 1986).
Complementary assets can range from manufacturing to distribution, to marketing and
commercialization abilities. In our data we observe whether the rms engage in promo-
tions at the rm, brand or product level.39 Advertising and promotion activities can shift
out the demand curve and reduce substitution. As a result we would expect a positive
e¤ect on the markup. Table 10 shows that rms that engage in promotion activities
do have higher markups. The e¤ect of product and process innovation on the markup
remains intact. We nd a positive coe¢ cient on the interaction between product innova-
tion and promotion activities in column (3). The interaction coe¢ cient and the product
innovation coe¢ cient are not statistically signicant. Note however that these coe¢ cients
are jointly signicant, indicating the markup increases by 2.7% in response to a product
innovation combined with promotion activities.
37The distribution of the number of patents registered by a rm in a given year - conditional on having
registered at least one patent- is heavily skewed to the right with an average of seven and a median of
two registered patents.
38Results did not change when we included lag R&D instead of contemporaneous R&D.
39We only observe this variable every 4 years. As a result we have fewer observations
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5.4 Markup Dynamics
In this subsection we estimate the dynamic e¤ect of innovation on the level of the markup.
We classify the rm observations according to the cumulative number of innovations we
have observed by the rm up to the year of observation and control for the time we
observe the rm in the sample and time and industry e¤ects. Results are displayed
in Table 11 and Figures 4 and 5. Table 11 indicates that the rst product innovation
creates a 2.3% di¤erential in markups with non-innovating rms. After realizing their
11th or more product innovation, the markup di¤erential has increased to 10%. Similar
results are obtained for process innovations. The results are even stronger for small
rms for whom the markup premium after realizing more than 10 product innovations
is equal to 20%. When using the full set of control variables in columns (3) and (4) we
do nd that for small rms product innovations have a cumulative e¤ect and returns
are indeed appropriated over time. We do not seem to nd the same e¤ect for process
innovations. One possible explanation is that product innovations can be cumulative.
A process innovation might be more likely to substitute the earlier technology. It is as
well interesting to note that the coe¢ cient on the cumulative number of years the rm
is already observed in the sample is negative and signicant, indicating that on average
rms that do not realize any innovation witness a continuous drop in their markup.
5.5 Young Firms and Innovation
Recently, so called young innovative companies have received considerable attention, both
from policy makers as well as from academics. Although they are small in numbers
 and obviously small in size as well they are thought to have a superior innovative
performance compared to incumbents. For example, Schneider and Veugelers (2008) nd
that young innovative companies achieve signicantly higher innovative sales compared
to other innovation-active rms. To test whether young rms realize higher innovation
returns we interact both the product and process innovation dummies with a dummy
equal to 1 if the rm is less than 6 years old. Results are reported in Table 12. The
results in columns (1) and (2) indicate that the markup premium of product innovation is
indeed higher for young rms, especially in the regression where xed e¤ects are included.
For process innovation, there appears to be no positive e¤ect of being young. On the
contrary, the estimates indicate that process innovation has no e¤ect on the markup of
young rms as the interaction coe¢ cient is negative, albeit barely statistically signicant.
As most young rms are small, we ran the same regressions on the subsample of small
rms in columns (3) and (4). The results remain the same.
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6 Prices, Marginal Costs and Innovation
We have established that innovative rms have higher markups compared to non-innovative
rms, even after controlling for market characteristics and rm xed e¤ects. In this last
subsection we disentangle these markup di¤erences into marginal costs and price di¤er-
ences. In the ESEE survey, rms are asked to report the percentage change in output
prices compared to the previous year.40 We can combine these price changes with our
estimates for markups to obtain a measure for year-on-year variations in marginal costs,
i.e.  ln cit =  ln pit    lnit. where  ln pit is the self reported percentage change
in output prices,  lnit the estimated percentage change in the markup and  ln cit
is the percentage change in marginal costs.41 We relate these price and marginal cost
changes with both product and process innovation. Product innovation is expected to
positively a¤ect rm level prices while we expect to nd no or even a positive relation
with marginal costs. Process innovation on the other hand is thought to put downward
pressure on both marginal costs and prices. Given that we have found process innovation
to increase markups, pass-through is less than one and the drop in prices should be lower
than the drop in marginal costs.
In a rst step we regress the self reported price changes at the rm level on the product
and process innovation dummies and a time xed e¤ect.42 The results are the following:
 ln pit = :14
(:07)
 prodinnovit   :25
(:05)
 procinnovdumit +yeart
As expected, process innovation puts downward pressure on prices and rms reporting
to realize a process innovation increase their prices less compared to other rms. A
process innovation in a given year depresses output prices on average by 0:25% points.
Product innovation on the other hand increases prices on average by 0:14% points. Both
coe¢ cients are statistically signicant at the 5% level.
Combining self reported price changes with the changes in markups provides us with
an estimate for variations in rm specic marginal costs and we regress these computed
year-on-year marginal cost estimates on process and product innovation and a time xed
e¤ect:
 ln cit = :14
(:27)
 prodinnovit   :48
(:25)
 procinnovdumit +yeart
These results seem to indicate that in line with expectations, process innovation lowers
marginal costs by :48% points while product innovation is not signicantly related to
40To be precise, the rms report the own price change for the ve most important markets it is active
in. The rm specic price change is then the weighted average of these rm/market specic price changes
with the share of each market in total rm sales as weights.
41Note that we only observe price changes and not the level of prices. De Loecker et al. (2012)
combine markup estimates for their sample of Indian rms with observed rm level prices to back out
marginal cost levels.
42The average price increase over the whole sample period was equal to 1:72%.
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marginal cost changes. The coe¢ cient on product innovation is positive but with a high
standard error such that the estimate is insignicant at any conventional level. Note that
the size of the e¤ects of innovation on prices and marginal costs are in the same order of
maginitude as its e¤ects on the markups estimated in Table 6. The results presented here
conrm the hypothesis that product innovation only a¤ects output prices and as such
impacts revenue productivity. Process innovation on the other hand reduces marginal
costs but these cost savings are only partly passed through to lower output prices leading
to higher markups. The results moreover show that the previous literature estimating
the impact of process innovation on productivity by using deated sales as a measure for
output, underestimates its impact on physical productivity as process innovation tends
to depress rm specic prices. Nevertheless, one has to bear in mind that our measures
for both the price increases and markups contain measurement error that spill over to
the estimate for marginal costs. Expressing the markups and marginal costs in rst
di¤erences is likely to exacerbate these errors (Griliches and Hausman, 1986) and the
estimated coe¢ cients should be interpreted with caution.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we seek to estimate the impact of innovation activities of rms on markups.
In order to obtain a rm level measure for markups, we follow the inituition by Hall (1988)
that uses the wedge between input revenue shares and output elasticities to identify them.
To this end, we estimate translog production functions using recent developments in the
identication of production functions, rstly introduced by Olley and Pakes (1996). Con-
sistent with the economic environment, we allow rms to endogeneously impact their
productivity evolution. Combining the estimated output elasticities with the input rev-
enue shares allows us to infer rm level markups. We link the variation in these markups
with a number of indicators that are expected to drive markup di¤erences. The results
are in line with theoretical predictions, increasing condence in our procedure to identify
markups.
Turning to innovative activities of rms, we nd that both product and process in-
novation are positively related with rm-level markups. Especially a change in design
of the product is associated with higher markups as well as process innovations due to
the introduction of new machinery. These ndings are robust against various speci-
cations. Finally we show, consistent with our markup results, that product innovation
leads to larger rm level price increases and does not have an impact on marginal costs
while process innovation puts downward pressure on both prices and marginal costs. The
results shed new light on the ndings of previous studies that have related innovative
activities of rms with measured productivity as this indicator includes both demand as
well as technical e¢ ciency elements.
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9 Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
All Small Large
Nr. of Firms 4,567 3,366 1,277
Nr. of Observations 33,570 22,574 10,996
Value Added (X1000 e) 20,810 2,649 58,091
Employment 256 46 687
Capital Stock (X1000 e) 12,222 1,542 34,992
Labor Productivity (X1000 e) 57.3 45.9 80.8
Labor Cost Share .54 .56 .50
Product Innovation .24 .18 .38
Process Innovation .33 .25 .48
Exporter .60 .45 .90
Importer .61 .45 .92
Nr. of Competitors
10 or less 57% 49% 73%
Between 11 and 25 15% 16% 14%
Over 25 10% 12% 6%
Atomistic Market 18% 23% 8%
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Table 3: Markups
All Firms Small Firms Large Firms
Median S.D Median S.D. Median S.D.
Cobb Douglas, OLS 1.64 .853 1.57 .811 1.78 .914
Cobb Douglas, Control 1.22 .717 1.17 .654 1.34 .813
Translog, OLS 1.48 .654 1.45 .671 1.53 .618
Translog, Control 1.20 .579 1.19 .573 1.22 .592
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Table 6: Relation between Firm Level Markups and Innovation Controlling for Endo-
geneity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FE FE FE GMM GMM SYS
Product Innov. 0.00941+
(0.00498)
New Components -0.00410 -0.000767 -0.00505 -0.0111
(0.00791) (0.00795) (0.0133) (0.0127)
New Materials -0.00616 -0.00816 -0.00643 0.00271
(0.00768) (0.00767) (0.0127) (0.0123)
New Design 0.0161* 0.0144* 0.0195 0.0238*
(0.00663) (0.00727) (0.0119) (0.0117)
New Function 0.0170* 0.0134* 0.0123 0.0186+
(0.00728) (0.00663) (0.0117) (0.0105)
Process Innov 0.00899*
(0.00420)
New Machinery 0.0144* 0.0103+ 0.0181+ 0.0142+
(0.00561) (0.00562) (0.00965) (0.00855)
New Methods -0.00914 -0.00486 0.00431 -0.00672
(0.00873) (0.00866) (0.0157) (0.0126)
New Mach & Method 0.00158 0.00107 0.0176 0.00202
(0.00619) (0.00625) (0.0107) (0.0102)
Lagged Markup 0.270** 0.307** 0.441**
(0.00712) (0.0182) (0.0159)
N 26828 23334 20877 17601 20877
Hansen P  Value 0.112
Standard errors robust against heteroskedasticity and within-group correlation. + p < :10, * p < :05, ** p < :01
Column (1) reports xed e¤ects. Column (2) reports xed e¤ects making a distinction between di¤erent innovation
types. Columns (3) to (5) include the markup lagged 1 period as an extra control. Column (3) reports xed e¤ects
estimates. Column (4) applies GMM estimation using rst di¤erences as instruments for the rm decisions and
lagged rst di¤erences for the lagged markup. Column (5) applies System GMM with markups starting from t  2
are used as instruments for the rst di¤erence equation. First di¤erences starting from t  1 are used together with
contemporaneous and lagged rst di¤erences of rm decision variables as instruments for the level equation. All
specications include sector and year dummies, controls for factor intensities and size dummies. Import, export
dummies as well as market characteristics are included as well but not reported.
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Table 7: Mutually Exclusive Types of Product Innovation
(1) (2)
OLS FE
Only Materials -0.0211 -0.0219+
(0.0182) (0.0117)
Only Function 0.0279 0.00452
(0.0231) (0.0142)
Only Design 0.0543** 0.0142
(0.0152) (0.00886)
Mat & Func 0.0332 -0.000318
(0.0236) (0.0164)
Mat & Des 0.0624** 0.00120
(0.0174) (0.00878)
Func & Des 0.0249 0.0360**
(0.0190) (0.0138)
Mat & Func & Des 0.0514** 0.0245**
(0.0161) (0.00852)
N 23334 23334
Standard errors in parentheses + p < :10, * p < :05, ** p < :01
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the markup which is com-
puted using the estimates for the output elasticities. All specications include
sector and year dummies, controls for factor intensities and size dummies. Im-
port, export dummies as well as market characteristics and process innovation
are included as well but not reported.
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Table 8: Innovation and Market Structure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS Small FE FE Small
Product Innovation -0.0196 -0.0268 -0.0128 -0.0133
(0.0214) (0.0235) (0.0139) (0.0160)
(Comp.<10)  Prod. Innov 0.0602* 0.0832** 0.0192 0.0214
(0.0239) (0.0284) (0.0149) (0.0179)
(10< Comp.)  Prod Innov 0.0822** 0.125** 0.0386* 0.0404*
(0.0270) (0.0322) (0.0168) (0.0200)
Process Innovation 0.0146 -0.00262 0.000134 -0.00290
(0.0165) (0.0181) (0.0110) (0.0124)
(Comp.< 10)  Proc Innov 0.0199 0.0401+ 0.0181 0.0254+
(0.0192) (0.0222) (0.0121) (0.0142)
(10< Comp.)  Proc. Innov -0.0160 0.0119 0.000355 0.00680
(0.0210) (0.0240) (0.0137) (0.0158)
Nr. Obs. 23080 15532 23080 15532
Standard errors in parentheses + p < :10, * p < :05, ** p < :01
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the markup which is computed using the estimates for the
output elasticities. All specications include sector and year dummies, controls for input factor intensities
and size dummies. Import, export + interactions with market structure included but not reported. Market
structure variables in interactions are one year lagged
35
T
ab
le
9:
F
ir
m
L
ev
el
M
ar
ku
ps
,
P
at
en
ts
,
R
&
D
an
d
In
no
va
ti
on
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
O
L
S
F
E
O
L
S
F
E
O
L
S
O
L
S
F
E
F
E
P
ro
d
u
ct
In
n
ov
.
N
ew
C
om
po
ne
nt
s
-0
.0
02
62
-0
.0
04
24
-0
.0
02
30
-0
.0
03
98
-0
.0
02
55
-0
.0
04
83
(0
.0
13
5)
(0
.0
07
93
)
(0
.0
13
5)
(0
.0
07
98
)
(0
.0
13
3)
(0
.0
07
91
)
N
ew
M
at
er
ia
ls
0.
00
59
1
-0
.0
05
81
0.
00
44
5
-0
.0
06
03
0.
00
35
6
-0
.0
06
84
(0
.0
13
4)
(0
.0
07
69
)
(0
.0
13
5)
(0
.0
07
74
)
(0
.0
13
4)
(0
.0
07
68
)
N
ew
D
es
ig
n
0.
04
74
**
0.
01
52
*
0.
05
01
**
0.
01
61
*
0.
04
90
**
0.
01
45
*
(0
.0
11
5)
(0
.0
06
65
)
(0
.0
11
5)
(0
.0
06
67
)
(0
.0
11
5)
(0
.0
06
64
)
N
ew
Fu
nc
ti
on
-0
.0
00
75
8
0.
01
66
*
0.
00
04
81
0.
01
86
*
0.
00
21
2
0.
01
64
*
(0
.0
12
4)
(0
.0
07
30
)
(0
.0
12
5)
(0
.0
07
35
)
(0
.0
12
5)
(0
.0
07
28
)
P
ro
ce
ss
In
n
ov
.
N
ew
M
ac
h.
0.
04
07
**
0.
01
46
**
0.
04
02
**
0.
01
37
*
0.
04
09
**
0.
01
32
*
(0
.0
09
75
)
(0
.0
05
62
)
(0
.0
09
77
)
(0
.0
05
64
)
(0
.0
09
83
)
(0
.0
05
62
)
N
ew
M
et
ho
d
0.
00
04
12
-0
.0
08
63
0.
00
13
4
-0
.0
08
42
0.
00
02
31
-0
.0
10
6
(0
.0
14
7)
(0
.0
08
75
)
(0
.0
14
7)
(0
.0
08
76
)
(0
.0
14
7)
(0
.0
08
74
)
N
ew
M
ac
h
&
M
et
h
0.
01
25
0.
00
13
8
0.
01
15
0.
00
01
40
0.
01
25
-0
.0
00
19
0
(0
.0
10
8)
(0
.0
06
20
)
(0
.0
10
8)
(0
.0
06
23
)
(0
.0
10
8)
(0
.0
06
20
)
P
at
en
t
(Y
/N
)
0.
05
54
**
0.
01
27
(0
.0
15
7)
(0
.0
08
72
)
N
r.
P
at
en
ts
0.
01
03
**
0.
00
03
93
(0
.0
03
39
)
(0
.0
02
03
)
L
og
(R
&
D
)
0.
00
12
4
0.
00
28
3*
*
0.
00
21
2*
*
0.
00
25
4*
*
(0
.0
01
04
)
(0
.0
00
99
7)
(0
.0
00
56
2)
(0
.0
00
52
2)
N
23
29
3
23
29
3
23
17
2
23
17
2
23
33
4
26
82
8
23
33
4
26
82
8
C
lu
st
er
ed
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
.
+
p
<
:1
0
,
*
p
<
:0
5
,
**
p
<
:0
1
A
ll
sp
ec
i
ca
ti
on
s
in
cl
u
d
e
se
ct
or
an
d
ye
ar
d
u
m
m
ie
s,
co
nt
ro
ls
fo
r
fa
ct
or
in
te
n
si
ti
es
an
d
si
ze
d
u
m
m
ie
s.
Im
p
or
t,
ex
p
or
t
d
u
m
m
ie
s
an
d
m
ar
ke
t
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
ar
e
al
so
in
cl
u
d
ed
.
In
th
e
re
gr
es
si
on
w
it
h
n
r.
p
at
en
ts
,
ob
se
rv
at
io
n
s
w
it
h
ov
er
15
p
at
en
ts
ar
e
ex
cl
u
d
ed
.
36
Table 10: Firm Level Markups, Innovation and Promotional Activities
(1) (2) (3)
Process Innov. 0.0348** 0.0335** 0.0335**
(0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0108)
Product Innov. 0.0274* 0.0253* 0.0108
(0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0344)
Promotion Activities 0.0667** 0.0643**
(0.0140) (0.0149)
Promotion  Prod. 0.0162
(0.0358)
Nr. Obs. 6349 6349 6349
R2 0.215 0.218 0.218
Nr. Firms 2985 2985 2985
Clustered standard errors in parentheses + p < :10, * p < :05, ** p < :01
All specications include sector and year dummies, controls for factor inten-
sities and size dummies. Import, export dummies and market characteristics
are also included but not reported.
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Table 11: Cumulative Number of Innovations and Markups
Controls Sector and Year All Controls
All Firms Small Firms All Firms Small Firms
Product Innovation
1st Innov. 0.0228+ 0.0416** 0.0151 0.0265+
(0.0128) (0.0155) (0.0125) (0.0145)
2nd   3rd Innov. 0.0522** 0.0708** 0.0409** 0.0460**
(0.0145) (0.0176) (0.0139) (0.0165)
4th   6th Innov. 0.0607** 0.105** 0.0447* 0.0642**
(0.0188) (0.0258) (0.0177) (0.0233)
7th   10th Innov. 0.0947** 0.108** 0.0754** 0.0599*
(0.0249) (0.0321) (0.0241) (0.0304)
11th   19th Innov. 0.0980* 0.196** 0.0765+ 0.154**
(0.0421) (0.0597) (0.0396) (0.0545)
Process Innovation
1st Innov. 0.0248* 0.0223+ 0.0123 0.00269
(0.0120) (0.0133) (0.0118) (0.0126)
2nd   3rd Innov. 0.0470** 0.0621** 0.0190 0.0233
(0.0135) (0.0158) (0.0131) (0.0145)
4th   6th Innov. 0.0552** 0.0795** 0.0192 0.0227
(0.0176) (0.0216) (0.0171) (0.0200)
7th   10th Innov. 0.0828** 0.0797* 0.0422+ 0.00510
(0.0244) (0.0345) (0.0241) (0.0321)
11th   19th Innov. 0.101* 0.111+ 0.0560 0.0211
(0.0406) (0.0587) (0.0385) (0.0518)
Nr. Obs 28295 19078 26828 18172
R2 0.165 0.148 0.212 0.212
Nr. Firms 3785 2735 3777 2731
Clustered standard errors in parentheses + p < :10, * p < :05, ** p < :01
All specications estimated by OLS. Columns (1) and (2) include sector and year dummies as well as the
number of years the rm is already included in the data set. Column (3) and (4) include as well controls for
the size of the rm, the market structure, the import and export status and input factor intensities.
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Table 12: Young Innovative Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All OLS All FE Small OLS Small FE
Process Innov. 0.0292** 0.0126** 0.0297** 0.0124*
(0.00813) (0.00465) (0.00994) (0.00600)
YoungXProc. Innov -0.00700 -0.0290+ -0.00396 -0.0133
(0.0232) (0.0150) (0.0252) (0.0164)
Product Innov. 0.0303** 0.000920 0.0413** -0.00390
(0.0103) (0.00547) (0.0145) (0.00748)
YoungXProd. Innov. 0.0342 0.0448* 0.0368 0.0491*
(0.0278) (0.0180) (0.0315) (0.0200)
Young Firms 0.0500** 0.0335** 0.0541** 0.0207+
(0.0168) (0.0101) (0.0174) (0.0109)
N 23994 23994 16410 16410
Clustered standard errors in parentheses + p < :10, * p < :05, ** p < :01
Column 1 and 2 report results for the full sample. Columns 3 and 4 focus on the subsample of
small rms. All specications include sector and year dummies, controls for factor intensities
and size dummies. Import, export dummies and market characteristics are also included but
not reported.
39
10 Figures
Figure 1: Distribution Output Elasticities
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Figure 2: Markup by Sector
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Figure 3: Evolution Median Markup
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Figure 4: Cumulative Innovations; All Firms
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Figure 5: Cumulative Innovations; Small Firms
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Appendix
A Properties Translog
A production function is usually considered to be well-behaved only if its marginal prod-
ucts are positive for all inputs and if the production function is quasi-concave, i.e. has
convex isoquants. However, there is no guarantee the translog production function sat-
ises these conditions at all data points.43 To compute markups, we only keep the
observations for which these conditions are satised. Moreover, we drop observations for
which the marginal product of either capital or labor is increasing.
The marginal product of an input is positive if and only if its output elasticity is
positive, which is easily checked in the data. To determine whether the production
function is quasi-concave the bordered Hessian of the production function needs to be
negative semi-denite. The bordered Hessian is given by:
H =
0@ 0 fL fKfL fLL fLK
fK fLK fKK
1A (A.1)
where fL = @Q=@L, the marginal product of labor and fK = @Q=@K the marginal
product of capital. The second order partial derivatives of the production function are
dened as follows: fLL = @2Q=@L2, fKK = @2Q=@K2 and fLK = @2Q=@L@K. For
this bordered Hessian to be negative semidenite, its principle leading minors should
alternate in sign. Specically, for a two input case, this implies that  fLfL  0 and
2fLfKfLK   f 2KfLL  f 2LfKK  0. The rst condition is always satised while the second
condition can easily be checked for every single data point as for a translog production
function the rst and second order partial derivates are given by:
fL = (L + 2LL lnL+ LK lnK)
Q
L
fK = (K + 2KK lnK + LK lnL)
Q
L
fLL = (2LL + "
2
L   "L)
Q
L2
fKK = (2KK + "
2
K   "K)
Q
K2
fLK = (LK + "L"K)
Q
LK
with "L and "K the output elasticity of labor and capital respectively. Note that we do not
impose in our estimation procedure these conditions to be satised for each observation,
but we choose to drop the observations not satisfying the criteria. Moreover, we get
rid of the observations for which the marginal products are increasing. The result of
this cleaning procedure can be found in Table A.1. The production function is well
behaved for over 90% of the observations when estimating the parameters applying the
methodology to control for the endogeneity of input choices. The observations where the
production function is ill behaved are concentrated in a number of smaller sectors. The
condition that is most often violated is the one requiring the marginal product of labor
to be decreasing. Note that the OLS parameter estimates result in a substantially larger
number of observations where the conditions are not satised. This is obviously due to
the upward bias in the labor coe¢ cients, resulting in a larger number of observations
having an increasing marginal product of labor.
43For a Cobb-Douglas production function, these conditions are globally satised if the input para-
meters l and k are estimated to be positive.
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Table A.1: Cleaning translog production function
OLS Control
Meat Products 46.6% 12.5%
Food and Tobacco 0.0% 0.0%
Beverages 100.0% 100.0%
Textiles and Clothing 6.3% 0.8%
Leather Products 100.0% 23.1%
Wood Products 4.0% 5.3%
Paper Products 100.0% 0.1%
Printing and Publishing 99.2% 0.0%
Chemicals 96.4% 1.1%
Plastic and Rubber 11.3% 3.1%
Mineral Products 7.4% 5.7%
Basic Metals 16.0% 0.0%
Metal Products 8.0% 2.6%
Machinery and Equipment 73.1% 0.2%
O¢ ce Machinery 81.3% 11.0%
Electrical Machinery 5.8% 0.1%
Motor Vehicles 0.0% 0.0%
Other Transport 0.0% 0.0%
Furniture 86.6% 61.2%
Miscellaneous 100.0% 38.2%
Total 37.5% 8.2%
The above table shows the percentage of observations
that do not satisfy the following conditions:
1) the production function has to be quasiconcave
2) the marginal products have to be decreasing and
3) the marginal products have to be positive.
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B Plausibility Output Elasticities Translog
In this section we check whether the implied rm level output elasticities of the translog
production function make sense economically. To this end, we rst correlate the output
elasticities with the size of the rm and second, we check whether rms with low costs
of long term loans are using more capital intensive technologies. The results of these
exercises are reported in gures B.1 and B.2 respectively. In Figure B.1 the output
elasticities of labor and capital relative to the industry average are plotted against the
size of the rm, in terms of value added, relative to the industry average. The dark grey
line represents the smoothed values of a local cubic polynomial of the output elasticity
on the size of the rm together with the 95% condence interval. Clearly, large rms
appear to use more capital intensive technologies, while smaller rms use more labor
intensive technologies which is in accordance with our prior. Figure B.2 relates the costs
of long term loans as a percentage of the outstanding total long-term debt.44 Since these
costs are an important component of the user cost of capital, rms facing lower costs of
long-term debt are expected to use more capital intensive technologies. This hypothesis
is conrmed as the costs of long term debt is negatively related to the capital output
elasticity. This relationship holds in a regression framework controlling for the size of the
rm.
44Firms self-report the average cost of raising external funds with a payment term longer than one
year, expressed as a percentage of the total loan. We observe whether the loan is acquired at a nancial
institution or other party. We take a weighted average of the two with total loans at either nancial or
other institutions as weights.
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Figure B.1: Relation between Output Elasticities and Size
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Figure B.2: Relation between costs of long-term loans and output elasticity of capital.
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C Firm Level Variation in Markups
This section explores in more detail the rm level variation in the estimated markups.
First we display the distribution of markups, second we briey touch upon the dynamics
of markups and its persistence. Finally we link our measure of markups with the most
often cited drivers of markup di¤erences.
Figure C.1 displays the distribution of markups for large and small rms for all indus-
tries pooled together. Clearly, there exists substantial variation in the markup around
the median with large rms having higher markups in general. In the main text, we
already showed markups to be pro-cyclical while highest markups can be found in the
Chemical Industry and lowest markups in the O¢ ce Machinery Industry. In Figures C.2
and C.3 we plot the evolution of the markup for the largest sectors in the dataset. Again,
the evolution of the markups appear to make sense and conrm our priors. For example,
the Textiles Industry has witnessed a decline in its market power since the end of the
nineties, which is due to increased competition from low wage countries in general and
China in particular (cf. Abraham et al. 2009, for evidence from Belgium).
Given the persistence of most performance indicators used in other studies, we expect
the rm level markups to display a substantial amount of persistence. Moreover, rms
with lower markups are more likely to exit the market. To test these hypotheses, we
divide the markups into ve di¤erent quintiles and estimate the transition probabilities.
Results are reported in Table C.1. The results show a ve-year transition matrix between
the di¤erent quintiles, higher persistence would show up as heavier entries on the diagonal
while the in the absence of persistence each of the elements of the transition matrix should
be approximately equal. Clearly, markups display a substantial amount of persistence.
The diagonal elements are the highest percentages and the values of the matrix decline in
the distance to the diagonal. For example a rm realizing today a markup in the lowest
quintile in a sector has a probability of almost 50% to be located in the bottom quintile
ve years from now. Moreover, these rms have a probability of almost 20% to exit the
industry over the next ve years, signicantly higher than the other rms active in the
sector. Note moreover that when the markup reaches a certain threshold, for example
is located in the upper three quintiles, a further increase in the markup appears not to
inuence the exit probability any further as only the lowest two quintiles have a higher
probability of exiting.45 Probit regressions of the exit probability on the markup showed
a signicant e¤ect of the markup on the probability of exit.46
Finally we relate the rm specic markups with variables that are expected to be
drivers of market power (f.e. Perlo¤ et al. 2007, p.30). More precisely we link the
markups with (1) market evolution, (2) market structure, (3) buyer power and (4) adver-
tising. Results are reported in Table C.2 and Figure C.4. First, for the market evolution,
rms report whether their main market is expanding, stable or shrinking. In line with
theoretical predictions, markups are higher in expansive markets compared to stable and
recessive markets. Second, we obtain the common nding that markups are higher in
more concentrated markets. Third, market power of rms can be constrained by buyer
power. In the ESEE survey, there is a question asking how many companies the rm is
selling to.47 Although imperfect, this gives a measure for buyer power. It appears that if
the rm has only a limited number of clients, markups are substantially lower. Fourth,
we link the markups with the promotional activities of a rm. Consistent with our priors,
rms carrying out promotional activities in relation to the brand or product image have
substantially higher markups compared to rms refraining from promotional activities.
45We have as well estimated one-year transition matrices, which - not surprisingly - resulted in higher
transition probabilities on the diagonal. Moreover we experimented with absolute levels of the markup
instead of deviations from the industry/year average. These markup levels displayed an even higher level
of persistence, again consistent with our prior.
46Results available on request.
47Zero buyers means that the rm only sells directly to consumers.
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Table C.1: Transition Matrix Markups
Quint. 5 Quint. 4 Quint. 3 Quint. 2 Quint. 1 Disappear Total
Quint. 5 45.5% 17.5% 9.8% 4.5% 5.0% 17.68% 100.0%
Quint. 4 25.0% 28.1% 18.6% 11.0% 5.8% 11.48% 100.0%
Quint. 3 13.8% 24.8% 26.4% 17.6% 9.9% 7.39% 100.0%
Quint. 2 7.1% 14.8% 21.5% 30.9% 19.4% 6.35% 100.0%
Quint. 1 5.2% 7.1% 11.7% 22.1% 45.6% 8.44% 100.0%
Estimated 5 year transition matrix. Firm specic deviations from the sector/year average.
Quintile 5 represents the lowest markups relative to the sector/year average. Quintile 1
represents the highest markups relative to the industry/year average
Table C.2: Drivers of Average Markups
All Small
Market Evolution
Expansive 1.29 1.30
Stable 1.21 1.19
Recessive 1.07 1.07
Nr. Competitors
10 or less 1.23 1.24
11 to 25 1.18 1.18
+25 1.17 1.16
Atomistic 1.10 1.09
Nr. buyers (companies)
1-5 1.09 1.07
6-50 1.17 1.18
+50 1.29 1.31
Zero 1.19 1.16
Promotional Activities
Product 1.29 1.30
Brand 1.30 1.34
Company 1.20 1.21
No Promotion 1.09 1.08
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Figure C.1: Distribution markups small versus large rms
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Figure C.2: Evolution Markup Selected Industries (1)
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Figure C.3: Evolution Markup Selected Industries (2)
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Figure C.4: Drivers of Average Markups
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D Accounting Markups
In the empirical industrial organization literature, the so-called accounting markup is
often used as an imperfect measure for market power. The accounting price-cost margin
is dened as PCMacc =
PQ zM wL
PQ
which is equal to true price-cost margin when there
are constant returns to scale and all capital costs are xed. We compute the accounting
price-cost margin and compare it with our estimate for the true markup.48 The simple
raw correlation between the accounting and estimated markups equals :57. In general the
accounting markup is higher compared to the estimated markup as can be seen in Figure
D.1, but the evolution over the business cycle is similar for both measures as they are both
pro-cyclical. The estimated markup appears to be more responsive to economic down-
and upturns which is consistent with a view that managers have incentives to understate
high prots and overstate low prots both for strategic as for tax reasons (Schmalensee
1989).
Despite the high correlation, there exist systematic di¤erences between the two mea-
sures in line with the theoretical predictions. First, we expect the estimated markup to
be relatively lower compared to the accounting markup for capital intensive rms. As
at least part of the capital costs are variable, the accounting markup will overestimate
the true markup and more so if capital intensity is higher. Second, under increasing
returns to scale, the average variable costs are an overestimate of marginal costs and
the accounting markup will underestimate the true markup. With decreasing returns
to scale the accounting markup will be higher than the true markup. To test these hy-
potheses we link di¤erences between our markup estimates and the accounting markups
with capital intensity and returns to scale. First, we divide our sample into high and low
capital intensive rms49 and compute the median markup for these two types of rms.
While the accounting markup is close to the estimated markup for low capital intensive
rms (acc   b = :05), the accounting markup is substantially higher relative to our
markup estimate for high capital intensive rms (acc   b = :15), consistent with our
story. Second, we link markups with our returns to scale obtained from our production
function estimates. Although there are constant returns to scale on average , there exists
substantial variation in returns to scale across rms. In Table D.1 we report the median
accounting and estimated markup for di¤erent returns to scale.50 For increasing returns
to scale, the accounting markup is lower compared to the estimated markup while for
decreasing returns to scale the reverse holds.
When measuring the returns to innovation, it is especially important to obtain esti-
mates for the true markup instead of relying on the accounting markup if the bias in the
accounting markup is systematically related to the innovative activities of rms, i.e. if
the returns to scale and capital intensity di¤ers between innovative and non-innovative
rms. Table D.2 reports the percentage of observations that report a product and process
innovation, split between high and low returns to scale and high and low capital-labor
ratios. Clearly, rms with high returns to scale are more likely to introduce a product
innovation. For process innovation the di¤erence between high and low returns to scale
rms are even larger. Note that when returns to scale are higher for innovative rms,
this means that the accounting markup will underestimate the true markup di¤erence
between innovative and non-innovative rms, leading the returns to innovation to be
underestimated when relying on the accounting markup. The capital-labor ratio works
in the other direction as the presence of a higher capital stock for innovative rms will
lead the accounting markup to overestimate the true markup by more for innovative
rms compared to non-innovative rms and the markup premium of innovation will be
overestimated.
48To be precise, we compute the accounting markup acc =
1
1 PCMacc which is directly comparable
with our markup estimate.
49High capital intensive rms are rms with a ratio of the value of machinery and equipment to labor
above the median of this ratio. Low capital intensive rms have a ratio below the median.
50The category of increasing returns to scale is dened as all observations for which the returns to
scale are higher than 1.05. Likewise decreasing returns to scale is dened as having returns to scale below
0.95.
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Figure D.1: Evolution Accounting Markup versus Estimated Markup
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Table D.1: Returns to Scale and Markups
Accounting acc Estimated  Returns to Scale
All 1.29 1.20 0.99
Increasing Returns 1.33 1.53 1.09
Decreasing Returns 1.26 1.03 0.91
Low returns to scale and high returns to scale refer respectively to observations with returns lower
than 0.95 and higher than 1.05 respectively where returns to scale are estimated with a translog
production function controlling for the endogeneity of inputs. For all variables the median value is
reported
Table D.2: Returns to Scale, Capital-Labor Ratio and Innovation
All Firms Small Firms
Product Innov. Process Innov. Product Innov. Process Innov.
Low Returns 20.0% 24.0% 15.4% 18.3%
High Returns 28.3% 39.7% 20.3% 30.2%
Low K/L Ratio 19.8% 22.8% 17.2% 20.1%
High K/L Ratio 28.9% 42.6% 20.1% 34.7%
Low returns to scale and high returns to scale refer respectively to observations with returns lower than 0.95 and
higher than 1.05 respectively where returns to scale are estimated with a translog production function controlling for
the endogeneity of inputs. Low and high K/L ratio refer respectively to observations above and below the median of
the capital to labor ratio distribution. Each time the percentage of observations that report a product and process
innovation is displayed.
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